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ABSTRACT 
The paper presents the results of a research on railway regulation and liberalisation in Italy, 
France, Germany and Spain. The analysed fields of regulation are the relationship between 
the State and the rail companies, network access conditions by operators, slot allocating and 
pricing schemes and how public service obligations are defined, paid and regulated. 
The aim of the paper is to give a comparative overview of the rail regulation from a critical 
point of view, rather than descriptive. The regulatory frameworks are outlined and then 
assessed according to their implications on the liberalisation level and on the effective 
market opening.  
The conclusions are that the actual level of liberalisation is still scarce and only in some 
cases the opening level is increasing. Market penetration of newcomers is significant only in 
niche markets. An issue emerging from the work is the opposing attitude of incumbent 
railways against liberalisation and the role of decision makers in backing this behaviour. The 
strategies followed to limit the outcomes of the liberalisation process are different across the 
country sample. However, all the incumbents argue with the self-referential declaration of 
efficiency, public service obligations and they claim to be under an excessive and unfair 
foreign competition. These arguments are yet embedded in legislative, organisational and 
economic settings supporting these positions like the common ownership of network and 
services, the permanence of dominant positions and favourable financial conditions. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The principles of European railways liberalisation covered in the directives EC 2001/14 and 
EEC 91/440 are supposed to be applied in the European countries in a similar way, driving to 
similar outcomes. In reality, the national interpretations vary substantially and this difference 
is deepened by the different starting point of the national rail companies (European 
Commission, 2006).  
The issue of rail liberalisation is quite vast. Literature deals both with cases and theoretical 
aspects. A limited number of comparative works is also available, providing a sort of 
comparison among liberalisation levels.  
There is some evidence available on railway liberalization and the set of options for 
restructuring which has already been implemented in different countries and circumstances. 
There are also international comparisons on the status of market opening in the European 
rail markets of the EU. The review of this evidence shed some light on the understanding of 
railway liberalization policies. 
In a comprehensive review of productivity and efficiency for the rail industry, Oum, Waters 
and Yu (1999) found that practically all the studies surveyed concluded that competition and 
deregulation improved productive efficiency. “For example, Canadian railways have achieved 
higher productivity growth than their US counterparts during the 1960s and the 1970s 
because Canada liberalized its rail pricing regulation in the 1960s. US rail productivity growth 
has been significantly higher following the extensive deregulation implemented by the 
Staggers Act of 1980”.  
In the case of freight deregulation, Winston (2006) and Pittman (2007) describe the changes 
in the American railway industry after the introduction of competition. It is important to 
remember that companies were already private when deregulation started. The key element 
of deregulation is the introduction of freedom and competition, and how this affects the way 
companies take short-term and long-term decisions on pricing, quality and investment in 
capacity and new technology. 
Intermodal competition appears crucial. From a shipper’s perspective, the intensity of 
competition at the route level among alternative modes is far more important than the 
number of railroads at the national level. No large railroad entered the industry following 
deregulation, while the number of railroads at the national level declined substantially as 
carriers consolidated through end-to-end (vertical) mergers and parallel (horizontal) mergers´ 
(Winston, 2006). 
This is common in the deregulation of railways. No big number competition is expected and 
competition between different modes of transport is one of the essential elements of the 
reform. Deregulation helped the railway companies to improve their productivity and financial 
results, reorganizing their networks through mergers, cutting unprofitable services, reducing 
the staff and negotiating new contracts with shippers.  
One of the most rewarding facts following deregulation was that productivity gains and cost 
reductions benefited shippers also, and therefore were not capitalized as monopoly rents as 
some sceptics with the new policy expected. Intermodal competition played a major role in 
the final distribution of the efficiency gains. 
There is some econometric evidence on the effects of deregulation in the railway industry. 
The main point with the econometric analysis reported below is the difficulty to capture key 
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elements due to the differences in types and intensity of the implementation1. We know that 
European governments have pursued, with different degree of enthusiasm (and with the 
resistance of the former railway monopoly) the reform decided in Brussels; therefore, the 
variable “reform” in the econometric analysis is unable to account for the factual content 
(effort, commitment, credibility) of the legal reform (see Quinet, 2006; Campos, 2006). 
Empirically, the evidence so far does not allow concluding on what is the best option for the 
restructuring of national railways. At least, we already know that more efficiency is 
associated with financial and managerial autonomy (Oum and Yu, 1994; Gathon and 
Pestieau, 1995; Cantos, Pastor and Serrano, 1999; Cantos and Maudos, 2000), competition 
(Rivera-Trujillo, 2004), and the gradual introduction of reforms (Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes, 
2004); on the contrary, subsidies contribute to inefficiency (Oum and Yu, 1994; Cantos and 
Maudos, 2000). 
Regarding vertical unbundling, the empirical evidence is inconclusive: Cantos, Pastor and 
Serrano, (1999) find that the separation of infrastructure and operations increases efficiency. 
The opposite result is reported in Rivera-Trujillo (2004) and in Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes 
(2004) is found no significant effect. It is worth noticing that in Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes 
(2004), United Kingdom is excluded due to data availability. 
In Sweden vertical unbundling seems to work well and in the UK, referred as the paradigm of 
how the separation of infrastructure and train operation has more costs than benefits, it is 
difficult to disentangle those problems associated to generic technical difficulties from those 
linked to the lack of political commitment or crude opposition to reform (Glaister, 2006).   
In the case of the European Union, the slow path of the liberalization process, compared with 
other network industries, also points to the existence of interest groups opposing the lack of 
privileges in a heavily protected industry. As Nash (2006) points out `...relatively little 
progress had been made in introducing more competition to the railways and virtually no 
open access operations had emerged. Many argued that this was because the existing 
legislation only provided for minimal rights of access for international rail freight operators, 
and left the administration of those rights, and the charges to be levied, in the hands of the 
existing rail operators, who had a vested interest in preventing them from being exercised.  
In practice, looking at the European Union experience concerning the attitude of member 
countries to rail restructuring, there is another reason to support vertical separation, even in 
the presence of coordination problems and transaction costs. The case for vertical 
unbundling is stronger when the existing public monopoly has some privileges and it is 
politically difficult to pursue the reform without reducing its actual power. 
Besides, former comprehensive regulation and political interference, and the bureaucratic 
culture embedded in the productive structures of the former public monopolies, make it very 
difficult to go ahead with the modernization of the rail industry without eliminating the former 
railway-government link, and modifying the way investment and operating decisions are 
taken. 
In a recent comparison of the liberalization in the rail markets of the member states of the 
EU, Switzerland and Norway (Kirchner, 2004), it is considered that the introduction of 
competition continues to develop at a slow pace. Some of the conclusions of this 
                                                 
1
 See Friebel, Ivaldi and Vibes (2004). 
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international comparison are eloquent with respect to the inconsistency between the 
declared objectives of the reform and actual government policies:  
 Many countries, even though they grant documented, non-discriminatory access to 
the market, in practice do not allow this due to expensive and complex licensing and 
approval processes. In particular, the approval of rolling stock still represents a 
considerable market access barrier. 
 In many Member States, the structural changes announced over the last two years in 
essence frequently incorporate existing institutions under a different name. 
 The regulatory bodies to be set up are frequently located in the ministries of transport 
of the Member States without the necessary resources, which is inadequate in regard 
to the functions to be exercised and the present initial stage of the liberalisation 
process. 
 In spite of the distinct trend towards internationalisation observed, the market shares 
of external railway operators remain only marginal. 
 only one third of the countries is, in a positive sense, clearly distinguished from the 
rest of Europe in regard to market access barriers. 
 
Recently, Nash (2008) provides a review of EU countries deregulation models, with particular 
respect to the topic of unbundling and the effect on competition. He recognizes the existence 
of three different models, namely the complete separation of infrastructure from operations, 
the separation of key powers and the holding company structure. Countries completely 
unbundled (UK, Sweden and Estonia) present now the broadest competition, but could face 
transaction costs in the future. In general, passengers service open access must face the 
problem of barriers to entry caused by the existence of large incumbent network operators 
and seem thus to have a limited future. Rather, franchising appears as more realistic for the 
large majority of markets, characterised by a limited dimension. 
 
With independence of the chosen model for railway reform, the restructuring of national 
railways requires the redefinition of the role of the government. The different models for the 
introduction of competition requires a government committed to play a new role in the railway 
industry: promote and enforce competition, limiting the regulatory tasks to protect consumers 
from monopoly abuse (when competition is not feasible or undesirable), and to guarantee fair 
competition between different operators, leaving productive decisions to the private sector. 
All existing barriers have to be reviewed; their factual impact on closing or impeding market 
access has to be analysed, so that such barriers can be eliminated or at least been reduced 
in order to open up former national railway markets and achieving the goal of a single and 
competitive European railway market. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to draw a picture of the railway sector liberalisation in four 
European countries: Italy, France, Germany and Spain. The aim is to describe, compare and 
comment the most relevant aspects related with railways regulation and economics. 
In particular, the topics discussed are: 
 the relationships between the state, owner and client of the national railways, and the 
company itself; 
 the conditions for the access to the network; 
 the way slots are allocated and priced; 
 the way “social services” (or “public service obligations”, or “universal service”) are 
defined, paid and regulated. 
A comparison of rail liberalisation levels across four European countries 
BERIA, Paolo; QUINET, Emile; de RUS, Gines; SCHULZ, Carola 
 
12
th
 WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
5 
2 THE INSTITUTIONAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
AMONG ACTORS 
2.1 The permanence of monopoly conditions 
Germany and Italy are the two countries where the actual separation between infrastructure 
operator and service operator is wider. However, in both cases the network manager is still 
part (in Italy totally) of a public holding, together with the train company, and this makes the 
separation rather formal2. In Italy the owner of FS Holding is the Ministry of Economy, while 
the responsibility of contracts and regulation is the Ministry of Transport. 
In the Spanish model the Ministry of Public Works is, in practical terms, in charge of 
everything, directly or by means of its regulatory agencies. Also, both rail infrastructure and 
services are managed by public bodies (ADIF and RENFE-op), owned by the same ministry 
despite controlled by different state secretariats and operating under a Program Contract. 
Using a different model, France can be considered as a country where separation is high, as 
RFF and SNCF are totally independent and are not two branches of a holding. However, 
they are in conflict in two fields: first on the field of infrastructure charges and slot allocation, 
as in other countries, but also in maintenance management: RFF is obliged by law to use 
SNCF as a sub-contractor for infrastructure maintenance operations through a contract 
which is discussed between them and both are struggling on the clauses of this contract, in 
terms of finance and in terms of quality achievement. At the beginning, SNCF benefited of a 
large information asymmetry, but this superiority is shrinking along the years. 
Moreover, in the four countries, the owner of the companies is the State (through different 
ministries) and, as we have already stated, is also the planner, the regulator and one of the 
main clients (when paying for public service obligations). This determines the existence of 
strong conflicts of interests that tend to slow down the liberalisation process. 
2.2 Economic relationships 
The national railways may receive substantial transfers from state or regions, in various 
forms: investments, subsidies for rolling stock, for service, for maintenance, public service 
obligations contracts, etc. and other hidden subsidies. The structure of these public 
interventions is complex, slightly different according to the country and partially evolved over 
time. 
From this point of view, the most important distinction is between the state aids, usually 
accorded “footing the bill” at the end of the year, and subsidies ruled by some form of 
contract. The first form is no more available, at least explicitly, because distorting the present 
and potential competition. Moreover, the distinction tends to be blurry because state owned 
rail companies benefit from the sovereign credit and there are strong political pressures to 
avoid bankruptcies of large companies. 
                                                 
2
 The intended partial privatisation of German railways is the most “advanced” case of unbundling in the sample: 
even if still under the auspices of a unique financial holding (Deutsche Bahn AG Holding), the train operator 
company will be partially privatised. Of course, also in this case, the fact that the state is by far the main 
shareholder will probably neutralise the effect of this privatisation in terms of separation. 
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Table 1 summarises the different sources of explicit public funding. 
 
Table 1. The structure of public support (tills) to the national railways.  
 Investments 
Network 
maintenance 
Services Rolling stock 
Italy 
State  RFI 
(Program Contract) 
 
State  RFI  
(special laws for 
single investments) 
RU  RFI  
(access charges) 
 
State  RFI 
(Program Contract) 
State  Trenitalia 
(long distance 
universal service) 
 
Regions  Trenitalia  
(regional services) 
No state subsidies 
before 2009
3
. 
 
Large subsidies 
expected in 2010. 
France 
State  RFF (for 
those investments 
not financially 
profitable) 
RU  RFF  
(access charges) 
 
State  RFF 
(contractualised 
subsidies) 
 
RFF  SNCF 
(maintenance 
contracts)  
State and Regions  
SNCF (for public 
service obligations) 
 
State and Regions  
SNCF (for pension 
integration and for 
past debts) 
For regional 
services, rolling 
stock amortization 
is a part of the 
financial 
arrangement of the 
contracts 
Germany 
Fed State  DB 
Netz (BSchWAG 
act and  
VIFGG act) 
 
Regions  DB Netz 
(GVFG act) 
RU  DB Netz 
(access charges) 
 
No subsidies 
Regions  DB 
(regional services 
only, RegG Act) 
 
No subsidies 
Spain State  ADIF  
RU  ADIF 
(access charges) 
 
State  ADIF 
State  RENFE-Op 
(public service 
obligations) 
 
Regions  RENFE-
Op (regional 
contributions) 
State  RENFE-Op 
(40% of 
investments) 
 
There are some relevant differences among countries, not only in the total amount of 
subsidies (see section 0), but also in the structure of the public intervention. The public 
budget can finance railways in four main fields, or “tills”: infrastructural investments, network 
maintenance, public service obligations and rolling stock. Assuming that rail infrastructures 
always need public investment, the straightest structure of transfers implies the financing of 
the social services only, with train access charges (TACs) sufficiently high to recover 
maintenance costs.  
The German system goes in this direction, despite of the complexity of the federal asset. 
There are no multiple tills, since the state explicitly finances only investments and some 
services. Two exceptions should be mentioned. Firstly, some regional tenders explicitly say 
“new rolling stock expected or preferred”, but this cannot be defined as a subsidy if there is 
an explicit request for new trains. Secondly, the network operator does not have, nowadays, 
direct subsidies. However, it must be noticed that transfers it receives for new investments 
include also “renovation” work, meaning e.g. track renovations of more than 1km or other 
                                                 
3
 Only 43M€ in 2007 from regions for regional rolling stock. 
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renovations with a long amortization period. According to how one defines the ambiguous 
concepts of “renovation” and “maintenance”, this may be seen as an implicit subsidy for 
maintenance4.  
In France the State and the Regions provide funds to the railways for infrastructure 
investment and maintenance, for public service obligation and for past debt related to 
infrastructures5. The French case presents a relevant peculiarity: the strong and conflictual 
link between RFF and SNCF, with the first one largely dependent on the second. RFF, in 
fact, must use SNCF as unique contractor for the maintenance of the network RFF is 
responsible for. However, SNCF is also its main (nearly the only) client.  
In Italy, the state transfers covered up to now three “tills”, except the rolling stock. This kind 
of  subsidisation however is not forbidden; rather, the financing of rolling stock has been very 
limited until 2008 because resources are very scarce and regions cannot (or do not want to) 
subsidise. In 2009, in fact, a huge (2 b€) mid-term investment plan has been launched, half 
of which is paid by the Regions and the State. The state transfers are partially defined by 
service contracts and partially paid by lump sum transfers related to specific issues6.  
The Spanish case is characterised by the nearly total absence of regional contributions 
(considering FEVE and other local companies as metropolitan). The largest share of public 
transfers comes from the central state. Similarly to France, in Spain the public purse provides 
significant contributions for all the four cost types (services, investment, maintenance and 
rolling stock). According to the current Program Contract, RENFE receives subsidies in 
exchange for PSO in Cercanias and Media Distancia services, not for Long Distance, HS or 
Freight services. These subsidies represent about 15% of revenues. The State also covers 
operating losses (about €150M per year in 2006-2010). Moreover, according to the Program 
Contract the state is contributing also by a co-financing of rolling stock. 
2.3 Total transfers 
The total amounts of transfers for 2007 from States to the railways are collected in the 
following Table 2. For simplicity’s sake, the table groups the various kinds of transfers used 
in the countries, according to three categories: the transfers subject to a tender (comparable 
to market revenues), the non-tendered ones and those for infrastructural investments. The 
infrastructural investments are not fully comparable among countries because they may 
include both renewal and maintenance, depending on the length of the network, and new 
developments. Moreover, the ordinary network maintenance is grouped differently across the 
sample, being in some cases partially included into investments instead of ordinary 
expenditure. The total demand in the countries is given just to help a comparison of the 
orders of magnitude, but not to provide a punctual indicator of unit transfers. 
 
                                                 
4
 The ambiguity of this definition is reinforced also by the fact that the subsidised monopolist is interested in 
defining the maintenance as “investment”, showing that the assets are increasing and not simply maintained. 
5
 The part of the debt related to infrastructure has been calculated when RFF was created, in 1997, and when the 
asset of the former SNCF was split between SNCF and RFF. 
6
 See next paragraph for further discussion. 
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Table 2. Total public transfers to sample railways 
[M€/year] Italy France Germany Spain 
Tendered transfers approx. 100 0 
4147 
0 
Non-tendered transfers 3224 6089 1772 
Demand (billions traffic 
units/y, excluding bus) 
79,7 122,3 173,6 31,3 
Infrastructural investments approx. 3900 2151 4270 2125 
Sources: our elaborations on official balance sheets: Ferrovie dello Stato (2007), Cambini et al. (2005) and 
CESIT (2008); MEEDDAT/SESP, 2008; DB, 2007; RENFE, 2007. 
2.4 Contractual relationships 
The European railway system is slowly moving from a framework based on concessions to 
another based on licenses or contracts. Before European liberalisation the national railways 
were considered as a tool to provide citizens with a service, which was partially paid by the 
state by annual transfers. This mechanism usually drove to go beyond the available budget, 
that was annually balanced off-budget by additional transfers. This situation was seen as 
clearly not acceptable for services both for efficiency reasons (inefficient use of resources) 
and for market reasons (a subsidised sector is not compatible with market conditions). 
Due to the unbalanced penetration of market services, the most evident evolution until now is 
the issue of contracts of service. Instead of transferring to the railways the requested 
resources, every transfer should be defined in a contract of service between the State and 
the provider, as if the state were one of the clients of its agency, together with users. 
The issue of the respect of these contractual agreements seems not to be a major problem in 
the analysed countries, except Italy and Spain. In France and Germany, in fact, the law 
guarantees a more stable regulation concerning minimum duration and financing of public 
service contracts. It allows regions and railway undertakings to better plan quality and 
quantity of the services provided and investments in rolling stock. The effectiveness of 
contracts, in both directions, is strictly linked to the enforcement system related. In case of 
lack of enforcement, like in Italy, both contractors can disobey the contract signed, since no 
major negative consequences would occur. When this reciprocal contract enforcement is 
missing, the railways tend to spend more than the promised amount (rising their debt, like in 
Italy, or requiring the State-owner to pay the red at the end of the year, like in Spain) or 
produce less in quantity/quality or reduce investments (in the ways permitted by the Program 
Contracts). 
2.5 Independent regulatory agencies 
A rail regulatory agency is supposed to have at least two different roles, in addition to the 
safety aspects. On the one side it must ensure a non discriminatory and fair access to the 
network, i.e. the monopoly component of the system. On the other side, the same regulator 
(or another subject) is in charge of regulating the level of passengers’ fares in case of 
competition for the market. 
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Concerning the network, in France an independent network regulator has been decided 
recently, at the end of 20097; it is mainly concerned with infrastructure charges (advice to the 
State which decides) and access. It will also work as an appeal for conflicts between the rail 
operators and the infrastructure managers (in case of discrimination, non transparency, etc.). 
In Germany the Eisenbahnbundesamt regulates technical specifications and the BNetzA 
enforces the track charging and anti-discrimination rules set in the “Allgemeines 
Eisenbahngesetz (AEG)” and the “Eisenbahninfrastruktur-Benutzungsverordnung (EIBV)”. 
Italian and Spanish networks’ access non-discrimination is controlled by the Ministry, which 
also has a role in deciding the toll level applied. In Germany and Italy there is also a second 
controlling subject: the Antitrust authority has power to intervene in case of complaints by 
private companies, as recently happened in Italy with the newcomer NTV. 
In France, the regulation on passengers’ fares is managed by the ministry for intercity 
transport. Regional passengers fares are fixed by the contract for regional services between 
SNCF and the regions. In Germany the regional services fares are defined in the contracts, 
while all the rest of the supply is market driven even if only one single provider exists. In Italy 
formally there is a price-cap rule, showing that the State wants to keep fares controlled for 
social reasons (see below). However, this rule is unattended and disappearing and the 
majority of long distance services is not-subsidised. In many cases FS changed historical 
capped services to “market” Intercity or High Speed services, sharply rising one-side their 
fares. Only for few services fares are kept artificially low upon Ministry request, despite not 
subsidised, as a consequence of arrangements between the two contractors and the local 
administrations8. 
2.6 Comments 
The previous analysis allows to point out some important issues. 
Firstly, despite differences across the sample, the actual level of unbundling is still quite 
scarce everywhere. In particular, the separation of the ownership of network and train 
company is missing, except in France. Also if the ownership separation is not foreseen by 
the European directive, it is commonly believed that this fact may slow down or even block 
(under certain conditions) the implementation of a fully liberalised environment at which the 
European directives were aiming to. In fact, we cannot exclude, a priori, that the common 
ownership of track manager and service provider may induce cooperative strategies in 
limiting the effects of competition. 
Secondly, the structure of all the four analysed national railways is still strongly linked to the 
former “command & control” scheme, where the railways tends to be a pure technical 
instrument of political decisions rather than real enterprises. This fact is much more evident 
for SNCF and RENFE, while DB is a little more advanced (not particularly for the recent 
decision on privatisation, but for the better regulation apparently in force in Germany). Italian 
FS is in a legal framework that could help to move FS towards a genuine competitive 
                                                 
7
 Through a law creating the “Autorité de régulation des activités ferroviaires” (Authority for railways activities 
regulation) 
8
 It is likely that fares regulation will be kept fictitious also in the future, being it applied on very few “social” 
long distance subsidized trains. 
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behaviour, but strong resistances from politicians opposed to the evolution, partially driven by 
firm’s wills. SNCF is developing a policy of a private management type, making a large use 
of yield management for TGVs and using mergers with other freight operators in order to 
become a worldwide logistic operator. 
In all the analysed countries the state has still too many conflicting roles: planner, client, 
owner and regulator. Also in this sense the German situation is more advanced than in the 
other countries, even if part of the conflicts still exist. For example, the vertical unbundling is 
everywhere limited to the separation of the former monopolist into two companies, but the 
infrastructure manager and the train operating company are still part of the same holding. 
The lack of separation in the ownership, together with the scarce power of independent 
regulatory bodies, most likely induces a convergence of interests even if every formal aspect 
were accomplished.  
Fourth, infrastructural investments are always paid by the public purse, except for minor 
shares of some large infrastructures. In the four countries the largest share of public 
transfers for operations goes to social services, mainly regional. Explicit direct subsidies for 
long distance services are present only in Italy. Infrastructure maintenance is not explicitly 
subsidised only in Germany, even if investments cover also part of ordinary maintenance. 
Direct subsidies for the all four cost areas (infrastructure building and maintenance, services 
and rolling stock) exist both in France and Spain. 
Finally, in the past (and sometimes also in the present), large debts burden the railway 
companies. The way these debts are covered is various (capital increases, equities, 
subsidies, new infrastructures, etc.), but all are based on the assumption that the railways 
cannot go bankrupt, cannot fire employees and must always respond to objectives of 
industrial policy. Market loans are either explicitly or implicitly state guaranteed and thus less 
expensive, returns on invested capitals are low or negative, capital increases may 
periodically cover past debts, etc. These conditions are very far from true competitive market 
conditions, even if often they are inherited from past behaviours. 
3 MARKET ACCESS CONDITIONS 
The countries’ conditions for the access of new operators into the national networks should 
accomplish with the general European rules. Their aim is to provide full and open access to 
every licensed operator. Despite the common legal framework, the level the European 
regulation has been implemented is quite different depending on the country. 
3.1 Conditions for licensing 
With “conditions for licensing” we define the necessary conditions that must be respected in 
order to obtain the license to operate.  
The basic conditions to obtain the licence vary across the sample, but are commonly present 
in all countries: certifications for the staff, technological equipments, characteristics of the 
enterprises, etc.  
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A different system is present in Italy, where requirements for licensing are less strict. It is 
necessary only a declaration that the required characteristics and certifications will be 
present at the moment of starting operation and not at the moment of the request.  
The German case showed that some access conditions may be too strict and thus 
discriminatory, in particular those concerning technological and staff requirements.  
Situations of Spain and France are less meaningful until now, due to the condition of 
statutory monopoly that prevented a significant access to the market from competitors, 
especially in the passenger sector. In the freight sector, shares remain limited but this seems 
not to be due to the ex-ante access rules. Rather, the narrowness of the market (in Spain) 
and short time from market opening (in France) explain better the lack of actual competition, 
together with incumbent’s power in the market, though in France the market share of new 
entrants in freight rose to near 15% in about 3 years. 
3.2 Access conditions for slots, services and terminals 
Once a new operator obtains the license, different rules exist to operate on a national 
network. All four countries have a “network statement” to rule the access to the infrastructure, 
i.e. to the natural monopoly components. The open access under licensing is not limited to 
tracks, but include also stations, depots, maintenance units, freight terminals. These 
elements are not strictly natural monopolies, in the sense that they could be duplicated, but 
may behave as barriers. In fact, the need of duplicating such facilities may prevent especially 
the entrance of smaller competitors or can constitute a relative advantage for the incumbent. 
For this reason, the regulator may decide to grant the access to these elements to all the 
competitors, whoever is the owner of it.  
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Table 3. Access conditions to fixed assets 
 Italy France Germany Spain 
Tracks and 
service tracks 
to depots 
Open to new 
entrants 
Open to new entrants Open to new entrants 
Open to 
new 
entrants  
Stations 
RFI, open to new 
entrants 
Divided into "technical" 
part (owned by RFF 
and accessible) and 
"commercial" part 
(owned by SNCF) 
DB Station und 
Service, open to new 
entrants 
ADIF, 
open to 
new 
entrants 
Freight 
terminals 
RFI, open to new 
entrants 
 
Some of them are 
transferred to 
Trenitalia and 
access is 
subjected to its 
approval 
Owned by RFF and 
rented out to operators, 
other competitors must 
apply to use them 
The majority is owned 
by DB Netz and rented 
out to  
Railion, few private 
owners, Container 
terminals are open to 
new entrants 
ADIF, 
open to 
new 
entrants 
Maintenance 
units 
RFI, open to new 
entrants 
Light maintenance 
units for rolling stocks 
are operated by SNCF 
but are 
considered as an 
essential facility and 
competitors have 
access to them. 
Open to DB Netz and 
private companies 
RENFE, 
not open 
Train depots 
RFI, open to new 
entrants 
Owned by SNCF, not 
open 
Open to operators and 
DB  
Dienstleistungen 
(Services) 
ADIF, 
open to 
new 
entrants 
 
In France train depots and maintenance units are owned by SNCF. However, only the 
access to maintenance units must be granted to all the competitors, similarly to what 
happens in Germany. It is likely that, if the owner is the train operating company, it will be 
difficult to demonstrate the lack of capacity even if the use should be granted as essential 
facilities. In Spain the national operator owns the maintenance units, not open to competitors.  
The Italian situation showed until 2009 the highest accessibility, as required by art. 20 of 
D.Lgs 188/2003: all the facilities were owned by the network manager and not by the train 
company (even when access must be granted to all the competitors)9. However, recent 
legislative modifications go in the opposite direction of closing-up the system again, by 
allowing RFI to transfer back to Trenitalia some freight terminals. For these facilities the 
access to competitors will be subject to incumbent’s approval10.. In general, the absence of 
any rule to manage the capacity of these facilities (pricing, etc.) should be clarified. 
                                                 
9
 Trenitalia has a contract with RFI for the management of the maintenance facilities. 
10
 The modification are introduced by Directive of Council of Ministries, dated 07/07/2009. The Senate of 
Republic debated on the norm on November 25
th
  2009, requiring a pronouncement of the Government on the 
fact that it reduces the right to neutral access to the network and a threat for private newcomers. No answers have 
been given at our knowledge. 
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It is likely that in the situations where the owner of facilities is the train operating company the 
access will be granted via contracts. However, in case of lack of capacity the owner can 
refuse access and some examples of controversy already raised. Recently, the Italian 
Antitrust authority received a notification against RFI made by the newcomer NTV, asking for 
the access to some maintenance facilities. The dispute has been solved in favour of RFI 
because it already signed a contract with the incumbent for the whole capacity one year 
before newcomer’s request. Similar problems have been claimed in France and Germany 
concerning the freight facilities. 
3.3 The issue of rolling stock 
The issue of the ownership of the rolling stock has never been properly discussed in the 
recent past, since legislators’ action mainly focused on the separation between infrastructure 
and services. However, its availability can prevent or hinder the access to newcomers, 
especially for large tenders. 
The rolling stock is not considered an essential facility in any of the countries considered, 
except for some German Bundeslaender (like Niedersachen), that own the rolling stock and 
lease it out to the train operating company that wins the tender. In other tenders, and for long 
distance trains, the company remains the owner of the rolling stock, which is amortised 
during the contract period. In general the national railways of the sample do not provide other 
companies with its own rolling stock in case of loss of a tender. 
The ownership of trains is however seen by theory (and by practice, in other sectors) as a 
competitive advantage, especially if financed or co-financed or guaranteed with public funds. 
This is the case of Spain, where a newcomer must purchase new trains with own funds while 
the incumbent enjoyed large public interventions. In France, the regions pay indirectly for the 
amortization and use of rolling stock through the financial arrangements of the contracts 
between them and SNCF11. In Italy, Trenitalia (between 2001 and 2009) self-financed the 
rolling stock expanding its debt, but it is finally guaranteed and supported by the State-owner. 
The German situation is clearer, since the new trains are paid by own funds or are explicitly 
included into the tenders, despite who is the train company.  
In general we can say that rolling stock is not strictly an essential facility, since some form of 
imperfect market of new and used trains exists. However, the ownership of rolling stock is 
often a barrier to the entrance of newcomers in the four countries, because: 
 in the case of passengers, the purchase of new trains takes some years, due to the 
low standardisation of rolling stock and because of the absence of a relevant 
secondary market; 
 trains owned by the incumbents are already partially amortised and in some cases 
co-financed by the state; 
 the state guarantee, that all national railways have on their debts, allows to obtain 
better conditions in the capital market (sovereign credit). 
                                                 
11
 However SNCF is a statutory monopoly. In the freight market, instead, which is, when this text is written, the 
single market open to competition, there is no public intervention for rolling stock. 
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We do not claim that the barrier completely prevents newcomers from the entrance into the 
market12 or that the entrance should be risk free, but that the regulator should consider 
whether an unfair advantage exists and try to minimise it.  
3.4 Comments 
Some comments can be drawn on the topic of the access rules and on the presence of 
barriers. 
Firstly, the licensing system is quite similar in the four countries except Italy. Italian norms for 
the obtaining of the licence are the least restrictive of the sample considered. Adequate 
experience and an appropriate level of the equity/assets ratio are not required, so the licence 
can be given some years before the actual starting of operations to almost any potential 
competitor.  
The analysis shows that, in the countries where the market is open, no major constraints 
exist due to access conditions to the network. In the four countries there is no evidence of 
problems related to grandfathers’ rights in the ownership of slots, but mainly because there 
are very few true capacity constraints except in nodes. The tool of auctions is never stated 
nor used to allocate capacity. Rather, the conciliation process provided also by European 
Directive among train operating companies, track operator and (if existing) rail authority is 
common. In countries where it is maintained, the common ownership of network and 
incumbent is, once again, a source of distortion. 
Concerning the open use of other rail facilities, in France and Germany the new operators 
experienced some difficulties in obtaining the use of the terminals, especially related to 
freight13. The other two countries did not show any constraint until now, but this does not 
mean that the system is able to grant access without any discrimination14. To the contrary, 
this simply means that there were no cases of conflict that were not settled by contracting 
with the network operator.  
The issue of the property of the rolling stock is present in all the countries. Newcomers must 
provide their own ones. This fact constitutes a barrier and a competitive advantage for the 
incumbent, especially for large regional tenders with no quality requirements. However, 
rolling stock cannot be considered as an essential facility and the problem must be gradually 
solved by the regulator. This issue would be less relevant if the newcomer is another national 
(or local) rail operator, which has the same dimension and the same public financing for 
rolling stock (as happens in Italy and France, see below in this paragraph for a comment) 
and can more easily afford a large fleet renewal. 
It is common (and easier than obtaining licence and slots) across Europe that a foreign 
newcomer with financial capabilities prefers to take over an existing local company to enter in 
another market. This fact is theoretically positive, if promoting competition. However, in the 
present conditions, it may occur that a protected monopolist with large financial resources 
may easily enter in other markets simply buying companies and in due time building up a 
dominant position in the continent. This is the case of French and German railways, which 
                                                 
12
 The recent agreement between the Italian newcomer NTV and Alstom ( 650 M€ for the supply of 25 passenger 
HS trains) goes in the same direction, but it is not expected that many small entrants may arrive. 
13
 This is obvious in France, since passenger market is not yet opened to competitors. 
14
 For an example in Italy, see the case of NTV, discussed above (section 0). 
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entered in Spain (DB Schenker and SNCF are majority owner of TRANSFESA since 2008) 
and Italy (for example, NordCargo is 60% owned by DB and, for passengers, NTV is 20% 
owned by SNCF) where the incumbent operators suffer from financial problems and are not 
fully able to react. The practice of taking over foreign companies is far from simple. If large 
economies of scale exist, the overall efficiency of the system may increase, to the final 
advantage of the users. But this scenario is both unlikely and undesirable for several 
reasons: first, large economies of scale are not realistic at this level and very difficult to 
ascertain; second, contestability will severely suffer; finally, the risk of abuse of the dominant 
position remains high (i.e. the risk that the benefits of the possible economies of scale are 
not transferred to the final users). Therefore, fair and enforced rules of reciprocity seem to be 
in this case a mandatory policy, in order to accelerate a homogeneous competitive context at 
European level. 
4 LICENSED OPERATORS AND MARKET SHARES 
Some years after the liberalisation of part of the markets (in particular the cargo one, but also 
the passengers’ business in some countries), it is possible to verify the actual level of 
competition looking at how many competitors exist and what is their market share. Of course 
the absence of competitors is not necessarily demonstrating the lack of liberalisation 
principles, for example because the market is too small and unprofitable. However, given the 
demonstrated presence of inefficiencies in national railways due to the burden of past public 
procurement, one can suppose that if the market is normatively liberalised and no significant 
barriers to entrance exist, a number of competitors will rise to exploit their better efficiency 
and “cherry picking” the most profitable services or introduce new products as happened in 
the air sector. 
For these reasons, this section is analysing the state of the market in terms of competitors 
and market shares in the four countries. The figures are limited to the national networks only. 
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Table 4. Overview of competitors' shares in the sample. 
National 
network 
Licensed operators 
(2008) 
All operating? 
(2008) 
Passengers market 
share 
Freight market share 
Italy 49 16 (2006) <1% 
A
 (2009) 
13,0% 
A
 (2008)  
(30% in the North-
South alpine market) 
France some no 0% 
B
 (2008) 
10%
 B
 (2008) 
15% 
C
 (2009) 
Germany 350 330 
Regional: 15,2% 
(2006);  
Long distance: <1% 
Overall passengers: 
10,1% 
B
 (2008) 
19,7% (2007) 
22% 
B
 (2008) 
Spain 
8 plus some new 
licenses recently 
awarded  
no 0% 
B
 (2008) 5% 
B
 (2008)  
Sources: if non specified, balance sheets data. 
A
 Internal source from FS. According to European Commission, 
2009a the share for 2006 freight was 11,5%. No official 2008 data available in 2009. 
B
 European Commission, 
2009b. 
C
 internal source. 
 
In France and Spain the passengers transport is a statutory monopoly of the incumbent 
national railways and no actual competition can exist. Since 2010 only the international 
market will be opened to competition. The two countries did not anticipate anything with 
respect to European deadlines. Germany is much more open and experiences already 
competitors in both freight and regional passengers services trough tenders. Italy has not yet 
competition on passenger market, but the legislation allows it and a couple of important 
newcomers are planning to enter before 201115. Freight market is normatively open, but 
actually significant competition rose only in the cross-alpine market. 
In the passenger transport, differences among the countries are evident, in particular 
between the situation in Germany and Italy, where all segments are or will be soon fully 
opened to competition (national as well as international passengers), and France and Spain 
where there will be an opening in 2010, but limited to international passengers services only. 
In conclusion, even where the norms allow the non discriminatory entrance in the market, 
this is only a necessary condition to the rise of an effective competition. Other conditions 
should be fulfilled in order to have competition, apart the necessary legal framework. The 
motivations of such fact will be discussed in the following. 
5 SLOT ALLOCATION AND PRICING 
The section provides an overview on TAC and how slots are allocated in case of scarcity. 
                                                 
15
 They are NTV in the high speed services and Arenaways in an interregional line in Northern Italy. 
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5.1 Criteria for TAC definition 
Concerning toll level definition, the directive 2001/14 does not set the objective of a common 
level of track access charges all over the EU (EIM and CER, 2008). The directive allows 
infrastructure managers to spread charges on their network, to reflect different costs or 
scarcity levels (Sànchez-Borràs et al., 2010).  
Toll definition criteria are very different across the analysed four countries, varying from the 
(formal) full cost recovery minus subsidies of German network, to the mixed methods used in 
French networks (highly differentiated charges, from roughly the marginal cost for freight 
trains and passenger small traffic services, to almost the full cost for profitable services such 
as TGVs, and for highly congested lines and periods). The infrastructure managers (and 
moreover the Ministries) include in the TACs a wide range of parameters and costs, which 
can hardly be compared. However, in none of the countries, effective discriminatory 
mechanisms for congestion and scarcity management can be found. Moreover, none of the 
charging systems can be assimilated to the one suggested by  EU Directive 2001/14 (Art. 7 
& 8). 
The table below summarises the main parameters and costs influencing the TACs. It is also 
outlined which  cost coverage criterion is used (marginal cost pricing or average cost pricing) 
and the responsibility of TAC definition. 
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Table 5. Summary of toll characteristics 
 
Main parameters influencing 
TACs level 
Peak or 
congestion 
charging? 
Cost coverage 
Responsible 
for toll 
definition 
Italy 
Line/ node type 
Occupation time (in nodes only) 
Time of the day 
Capacity reduction 
(“omotachicità”) 
saturation 
signal only 
Short run average 
cost (conventional) 
Operating costs plus 
investment debt 
amortising  
(high speed) 
Ministry of 
Transport, 
proposal by 
RFI. 
France 
Fixed component 
Reservation (per trainkm) 
Stops 
Type of service 
Traffic level 
Time of the day 
Yes 
Short run marginal 
cost, plus scarcity 
signal (in general) 
Where the market 
allows it, extra 
charges rise 
significantly the TACs  
The State, 
with advice 
from the 
regulator 
Germany 
Line type 
Service type 
Capacity reduction 
Load component (heavy trains) 
Length of trains (station) 
Type of station 
Surcharge on 
some type of 
services 
Between short and 
long run average cost 
DB Netz, 
controlled by 
the regulator 
Spain 
Line type and traffic 
Capacity or  commercial load  
of the train 
Time of the day 
Station platform and position 
Other unrelated fees 
Yes 
Weak correlation with 
costs 
Ministry of 
Public Works 
5.2 Criteria for slot allocation 
The above described norms set the price for the usage of the network. A relevant problem is 
the way slots are allocated to the service providers in case of multiple and conflicting 
requests. The issue is relevant in Germany and Italy only, because they are the only two 
countries where a significant number of new entrants is present.  
In general, there is no evidence of slot allocation rules in the analysed countries, nor the 
existence of a regulator with full powers to take decisions about that. This fact, even if the 
problem is not yet at stake due to the scarce actual competition, may introduce important 
discriminating potential like the grandfathers’ rights in the air transport. A newcomer, for 
example, could be interested in a slot at a certain time of the day in a congested station, but 
this slot is already occupied by the incumbent. This kind of problem never raised until now 
because the share of newcomers is small, occupying niches or concentrated in freight 
business, much less sensitive to slots16. However, the rising of competition for long distance 
                                                 
16 Curiously, in Italy this kind of problem raised, up to now, in disfavour of the incumbent. In fact, licensed companies can 
block in advance shares of the available capacity, even before having the certification of the rolling stock. This right will be a 
substantial advantage towards other newcomers when capacity will become scarce. Of course the incumbent still keeps the 
majority of slots. 
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high speed services could move this issue to the surface and become a relevant barrier to 
entrance. 
A bidding system or a discriminatory charging mechanism would help to efficiently solve the 
problem, but an independent authority is needed to manage such issue, now left to the 
infrastructure manager in the majority of countries (it is the role of the regulator in France).  
5.3 Correlation among TACs and production costs 
The way TACs are defined shows that the correlation between costs and TACs is a topic 
faced differently in the four countries. 
Everywhere, large shares of infrastructural investments are covered by state transfers are 
not priced and, then, not included in the TACs. For this reason, the concept of “average cost 
pricing” refers usually to the average costs excluding the (large) share of the fixed initial 
costs, never amortised.  
This is the situation of Germany, where the pricing is assumed to cover the long run average 
costs, excluding state subsidies for investments and part of the maintenance (EIM and CER, 
2008). France aims at covering the whole production costs of RFF, but in 2004 this target 
was by far not reached and further subsidies existed. The Italian situation is more similar to 
the German one for the high speed network (where also a share of investment costs, less 
than 20%, is supposed to be paid back via toll revenues), while conventional network 
investments are completely paid by the state. Transfers for maintenance exist, too, showing 
that cost coverage is not complete. Spanish network revenues do not cover costs and it is 
strongly dependant on state transfers, though the L. 200 requires “access charges to cover 
costs” (in very broad terms). 
5.4 Comments 
The TAC level alone is not determining the openness or closeness of a system. The German 
ones are the highest, but there is also the highest level of competition. Other factors are 
much more relevant in allowing competition, such as the profitability of services, the potential 
dimension of the market, the fares and the subsidies accorded, as well as the political will to 
remove market and normative barriers. So, if substantial barriers to the competition exist, 
these do not generally lay in the access TACs calculation. 
A problem of cross subsidisation between business units (i.e. between regional and long 
distance services) may exist. This allows the incumbent to skip the separation of balance 
sheets and distorts the market both in favour or disfavour of the incumbent, according to 
what subsidises what. 
A second issue concerns the slot allocation in main stations or lines. Up to now, it has not 
been a relevant obstacle to competition, but it may rise in the next future, especially on urban 
nodes and on truly congested lines. In fact, in none of the countries except France an 
appropriate regulatory tool or an independent referee exist to manage the issue. Competition 
on high standard commercial services (that require specific slots and speed standards) is 
expected to rise soon on some routes, especially where new HS lines made available new 
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capacity. In these cases, one can expect that a form of grandfathers’ rights may exist also in 
the rail sector, with the incumbent already using the “best” slots on lines and in stations. 
6 REGULATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATIONS (PSO) 
6.1 Definition of social and market services 
Social services are those subject to public service obligations (“PSO” in the following) and 
are a crucial issue in the whole rail sector regulation. A theoretical discussion is not possible 
here, but it can be found, for example, in Ponti (forthcoming). 
In the four countries the rail service is charged by an intrinsic value, i.e. is implicitly 
considered a merit want for distributive, land use and environmental reasons. For this 
reason, the provision of rail services is seldom ruled by market demand and fares are kept 
low. However, there are some differences. All countries consider all the regional services as 
PSO. For long distance transport, to the contrary, the definition of “social” is different. In all 
the cases, however, the infrastructures, hosting both social or market services, are 
subsidised. 
The Table 6 summarises the classification of social services. 
 
Table 6. Classification of social and market services 
 Regional services Long Distance services Freight services 
Italy Social  
Market: High speed, some 
IC, International 
Social: Some LD services 
(some IC, Express, Night) 
Market, but non-profitable 
 
Some subsidised areas 
France 
Social  
Discounted tariffs for some 
categories 
Market: TGV, some IC 
Social: some IC and LD. 
Unofficially, some TGV are 
covered by cross-subsidies 
from the profitable services 
A few social discounted 
tariffs for some categories  
Market, but non-profitable 
Germany 
Social  
(“sufficient public passenger 
service for short distance 
mobility, below 50 km 
distance”) 
Market 
Discounted tariffs for 
disabled users 
Market 
Spain Social  Market  Market 
 
All countries consider regional transport as social and worth subsidising. The rest of the 
services are supposed to be “market” services, except for some specific cases in Italy and 
France, where some long distance services (and even freight, in Italy) are also subsidised. 
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However, the way infrastructure is subsidised may hide implicit subsidies to all services, 
keeping access TACs very low, even below the marginal costs. 
The criterion of “sociality” of services is generally confused with the profitability of it (with the 
partial exception of Germany (Link, 2004)). If a service is not profitable but existing, it is 
implicitly considered as socially desirable and must be subsidised in some way (direct 
subsidy or cross-subsidisation). Clearly, this criterion is not satisfying, because unprofitable 
services may not be socially desirable because they are too expensive, or lines are 
subsidised even though they would be profitable if they were more efficient. A criterion of 
sociality based on the explicit accounting of social and financial implications of a single 
service is thus needed. This must be kept strictly separate from the concept of profitability, in 
the sense that all services must be profitable from the viewpoint of the service operator, 
independent from their “sociality”. The present concept of sociality may also distort the 
liberalisation process, as it will be discussed in section 0. 
6.2 Regulation of the social services 
Whatever the definition for social services is, the four countries apply different regulatory 
strategies.  
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Table 7. Regulatory strategy 
 Regional services Long Distance services Freight services 
Italy 
Fares decided by regions 
Few tenders for services. 
Usually in house contracts 
between regions and 
incumbent Trenitalia 
Price-cap on fares for 
subsidised services 
(theoretically). In reality, fares 
are decided by the Ministry in 
the contract of service 
No fares regulation in market 
services. No explicit subsidies 
Presence of non-subsidised 
“market” services, fed with 
cross subsidisation 
No fares regulation 
 
Some subsidies in 
southern regions, as 
described in the 
“Contratto di Servizio” 
France 
Fares discussed  by regions 
and SNCF and included in 
the contract with SNCF 
Only in house contracts 
Fares regulation for 
monopolies, but also on all IC 
trains 
Subsidised discounts for some 
categories of users 
A light fare regulation 
(achieved by the State) in 
market services  
Presence of non-subsidised 
“market” services, fed with 
cross subsidisation 
No fares regulation 
Germany 
Tenders or in house 
contracting with regions, 
defining the service 
characteristics  
Tenders for subsidised 
discounts for some 
categories of users 
No fares regulation 
 Subsidised discounts for 
disabled users 
No fares regulation 
Spain 
Subsidy linked to PSO but 
cost-plus in practice 
Cost-plus in practice 
Subsidised discounts for some 
categories of users 
No fares regulation 
 
In the regional market fares are always decided or controlled by the Regions (or by the 
Ministry, in Spain) that actually plan and pay for these services. French, Italian and German 
long distance fares are free of regulation (with some distinctions in France and Italy). Social 
contents are granted by subsidised discounts to the users-side instead of impositions on the 
supply-side, except in Italy. Spanish fares are capped by the Ministries, at least for the 
subsidised services. The so called “market” services are completely free in Italy since 2007, 
but fares adjustments on some marginal lines has been partially limited due to contingency 
reasons. In France exist some theoretically “market” services, whose fares are controlled and 
compensated by the state. 
The contracts of services (or even direct commitment, in many cases) with the incumbent are 
presently the most used practice in some German Laender, in Italy, in France and in Spain 
where the regional services are monopolies of SNCF and RENFE. By contrast, the practice 
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of tendering subsidies, especially for regional services, is almost never applied, despite it is 
supposed to be the compulsory one and stimulating efficiency. Germany is the only country 
where significant shares of regional services are tendered (Link, 2004), while in Italy this 
happened only in a few isolated cases17.  
6.3 Financing of the social services 
Social services are subsidised by the public purse. Usually, for the largest share of the 
subsidised services, i.e. regional transport, the funds come from the regions, but in some 
countries are partly transferred from central state, while local authorities provide some extra 
financing. Investments and network maintenance are not discussed here, but are almost 
always centrally paid for the part not covered by market revenues.  
In Italy, between 2002 and 2005, 1209M€/year has been transferred on average for regional 
transport from regions and 480-490M€/year for the universal long distance and freight 
services from the state, reduced in 2006 to 377M€. In 2007 there was an increase to 1488M€ 
and 445M€, respectively18. Transfers from State for 2009-2011 regional services will be 
increased of further 480M€/year that are explicitly dedicated to the incumbent operator (Dlgs. 
185/2008 art. 25) with evident negative effects on potential competition. 
In France, the social services of regions are financed by the contracts between the regions 
and SNCF. The regions transfer two funds to SNCF: one for the financing of the transport 
services, the other for the renewal of rolling stock and for infrastructure improvement. The 
amount of these funds is reported in  
Table 8 and are constantly increasing since 2002. 
 
Table 8. Public funds for regional services to SNCF  
[M€] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
CAGR 
‘02-‘07 
operating account: public transfers  
(social tariffs compensation and  
service obligation for Transilien services 
included) 
2.827 2.901 3.251 3.404 3.577 3.710 6% 
Investment account: rolling stock renewal  
contribution and other grants 
598 605 572 735 902 1.055 12% 
Total 3.425 3.506 4.823 4.139 4.479 4.765 7% 
 
The German Federal Government allocates funds (2008: 6.6 bill. Euro) to the Laender, which 
orders the service from transport companies in general. It is up to the Laender to define the 
volume, the quality and also the modality of the service. They can finance both regional rail 
services and urban public transport, which in some cities includes rail as well. The “rail” 
expenditure goes to DB, but also to many other local providers. The “public transport” class 
goes mainly to bus and tram services, but in some cities also conventional rail is used for 
urban transport. The total of 4.147 M€ transferred to the DB in 2007 (see Table 2) comes 
from both classes. 
 
                                                 
17
 Some large tenders are expected in Piedmont region in 2011. This will be the only case of a region tendering 
out all its services instead of contracting with the incumbent Trenitalia. 
18
 Source: “Piano Industriale FS 2007-2011” 
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Table 9. Regional expenditure for local transport services in Germany.  
[M€] 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
CAGR 
‘96-‘08 
rail 4.462 4.529 4.597 4.666 4.736 
4.80
7 
4.40
6 
0,8% 
public 
transport (rail 
included) 
2.283 2.317 2.352 2.387 2.423 
2.45
9 
2.27
0 
13,6% 
Total 6.745 6.846 6.949 7.053 7.159 
7.26
6 
6.67
5 
3,3% 
 
In Spain regional services are subsidised by the state, and not by regions, with approx. 
300M€/year. 
6.4 Relationship between social and market services 
An unclear relationship between social and market services, as shown above, is a source of 
distortions. In particular, the way in which unprofitable not-subsidised services are 
maintained for political reasons as social services, determines the existence of cross-
subsidisation. Cross-subsidisation, in the general definition, is a problem because 
monopolistic unregulated market generates profits that may be used to dump on other 
markets: profitable monopolistic services can be used to lower the price of other non-
monopolistic services, causing unfair competition on this second market. 
This is not the case of European railways, or at least not yet. Cross-subsidisation is mainly 
not between profitable services, but from profitable to unprofitable services, maintained for 
reasons other than those of the enterprise rationale. In fact, aside from market services, 
whose running costs are covered by market revenues, and social services, for which 
revenues include also subsidies, there is a third “hidden” segment. It is that of losing market 
services, i.e. those trains whose market revenues are not sufficient to pay their costs and 
whose existence is possible only via hidden “subsidies” from other market segments or other 
services. Typically, this phenomenon is seen in long distance segment. 
The companies forced to internally subsidise with profits some social services, may suffer 
from “cherry-picking practices” by the potential competitors exploiting the best markets only. 
In this case, a newcomer can enter in a profitable market at a lower price, because it does 
not have to subsidise other services. The main problem is not on the effectiveness of 
competition (market will be more efficient, pushing the less efficient company out of the 
market), but on the balance of the incumbent. The possible outcomes of this practice are a) 
the increase of debts or subsidies to the incumbent, if the choice is to keep the cross-
subsidies there, or b) the cut of the unprofitable services, if the incumbent has the political 
power to do that. The solution is, at least theoretically, to move “shadow” social services from 
the “hidden” segment and subsidising them explicitly (if the case, through a tender). At the 
same time, a fair competition on the main market will be able to reduce monopoly extra-
profits and/or inefficiencies on profitable services. 
The country analysis shows that the practice of cross-subsidisation among profitable and 
unprofitable trains is present, for sure, in Italy, Spain and France (TGVs included). The 
feeding of money-losing trains with the revenues of profitable ones is especially threatening 
Italian and Spanish railways, leading to an overall negative result for the whole long distance 
A comparison of rail liberalisation levels across four European countries 
BERIA, Paolo; QUINET, Emile; de RUS, Gines; SCHULZ, Carola 
 
12
th
 WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
25 
sector. For SNCF this leads to a smaller problem due to the level of fares and subsidies 
received for all the productive segments. The information on the German system does not 
allow to derive the same conclusions, but it is possible that some losing trains are left, at 
least those with the function of feeders. 
However, in case of competitive environments, a system deeply based on cross 
subsidisation among trains makes the system substantially not contestable and thus 
favourable for the incumbent. In fact, if cross subsidisation is justified in terms of social goals 
(i.e. granting the existence of social trains without directly subsidising it), it makes it 
impossible to separate the two kinds of services. If this is true, the incumbent will ask to 
exclude the profitable services from competition (or tendering) in order to let them pay the 
other trains. This behaviour has the consequence of keeping the market closed. 
German railways seem to have succeeded in minimising this problem, separating effectively 
the two businesses at their advantage, by eliminating services unprofitable for them (even if 
maybe “useful” from a social point of view, like some interregional services) or shifting them 
under the regional cap. However, an important form of cross subsidisation, this time in favour 
of the rail company DB, is the practice of applying lower access fares to freight and long 
distance services, than for regional heavily subsidised ones. 
Except some distortions, the German situation in this field seems acceptable for the firm but 
also for the collectiveness. In fact, it is capable to reduce the unclear implicit subsidisation of 
unprofitable services, eventually moving them among the “social” ones. These unprofitable 
services might be evaluated from a social point of view and explicitly subsidised via tenders 
in order to select the most suitable and efficient producer for them. This process could 
evidence the inappropriateness of railways to grant this kind of supply. An example is the 
long distance north-south Italian trains. It is likely that a mix of subsidised air and bus 
connections might offer a similar or better service at a lower social cost. 
6.5 Comments 
PSOs in rail sector are very relevant and requiring considerable public subsidies to be 
maintained. At the same time, rail undertakings tend to concentrate in the most profitable 
segment of market services where yields are high especially because intermodal competition 
is still completely absent.  
Regional services are considered everywhere as PSO and account for the largest share of 
subsidies (or the totality in Germany). Italy is the only country where some long distance 
services are explicitly subsidised. However, an implicit subsidy trough cross subsidisation is 
present and important also in France and Spain. DB succeeded in cutting all non profitable 
services or moving them in the regional segment. 
In general, however, a real criterion of sociality is needed. This lack is dangerous in a twofold 
way. For the rail undertakings, the existence of losing but not subsidised services is 
generating a financial loss. For the users, the existence of such services may distort 
liberalisation process if this is used by incumbents to keep profitable and unprofitable 
services bundled at their advantage. In general, since the State is paying for every losing 
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service (via subsidies or via losses in the balances of the railways), the suggestion is to 
maximise transparency and competition in order to obtain efficiency in all services19.  
The alternative way to provide social services is to guarantee subsidised discounts for some 
categories of users. Only in Italy this is not done and the protection of low income demand is 
supposed to come from the supply side with regulated fares and subsidised trains. However, 
the tendency of FS is to cut these services especially where conflicting with market ones or 
ask for more subsidies. This behaviour is generating problems both with users and Regions. 
In the other countries of the sample the subsidy to the demand is used but could be further 
extended.  
 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The introduction of competition in the railway industry has improved its efficiency for the 
benefit of users, producers and taxpayers. This is a key result of the reformation of the 
sector, that is still ongoing. However, there is not a unique recipe for “how to conduct the 
process” applicable to all the countries, due to the different contexts, such as the situation of 
their railway networks, population density, degree of congestion, effectiveness of intermodal 
competition, courts of justice, regulatory and antitrust institutions. 
The paper has analysed some of the most relevant aspects of rail liberalisation: the 
relationships between the state and the rail company, the conditions for the access to the 
network, the slots allocation and pricing systems and the regulation of “social services”. The 
picture drawn is complex and shows that the States applied the common European 
regulation at their own internal situation, deeply reflecting their different policy visions. 
Evidence support that it is very helpful to introduce more competition into railways, since the 
old state-owned rail monopoly model has not performed very well.  
The basic issue is that of vertical integration and ownership. Different strategies were 
possible, but the four analysed countries chose the vertical unbundling under a unique public 
holding (in Italy, Germany and France) or with two different public companies (in France). 
This way to separate infrastructure and train operations is, in fact, the most demanding in 
terms of government intervention and in general the most complex20. The European Union 
has however opted for this alternative, now mandatory for all member countries, to maximise 
competition in railway services.  
In order to obtain the potential benefits from vertical unbundling the aim of solving the 
technical coordination problems is not enough. A sophisticated regulatory structure is also 
needed, and especially a government willing, firstly, to leave the market to work; and 
secondly, to promote and enforce competition. Our countries sample shows heterogeneity 
and some incoherencies in many aspects, despite they all followed the general principles of 
European liberalisation. 
At the basis of a regulatory structure in an unbundled network, there is the introduction of a 
licensing system and the setting of an access charging systems to provide new entrants with 
                                                 
19
 Often some services are in the red because ran in an inefficient way, despite the existence of some demand. 
Italian long distance PSOs are a relevant case in this sense. 
20
 The natural monopoly is only in the infrastructure, but the relation between infrastructure and operations 
appears to be more complex than in road, ports and airports where vertical unbundling is the norm. 
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the rail tracks, stations, signalling, etc. Access charges are crucial in the reform. These 
prices for the use of the infrastructure can foster competition between new railway 
companies willing to enter the market and the former operator, but can also restrict the 
interest of new companies, unless they are carefully designed. The strict and not only formal 
separation between the infrastructure company and the incumbent public rail operator is 
essential. The privatisation of the public rail operator could help. 
Looking at the actual level of liberalisation produced by existing regimes, we can conclude 
that it is still scarce and only in some cases the opening level is increasing. Market 
penetration of newcomers is significant only in niche markets. An issue emerging from the 
work is the opposing attitude of incumbent railways against liberalisation and the role of 
decision makers in backing this behaviour. The strategies followed to limit the outcomes of 
the liberalisation process are different across the country sample. However, all the 
incumbents argue with the self-referential declaration of efficiency, PSOs and the claim to be 
under an excessive and unfair foreign competition. These arguments are yet embedded in 
legislative, organisational and economic settings supporting these positions like the common 
ownership of network and services, the permanence of dominant positions and favourable 
financial conditions. 
In conclusion, the future of railways depends on their capacity to respond to the evolving 
transport needs. Protectionism has shown its incapacity to maintain rail market share. 
Liberalisation can help the railway industry to recover traffic in those markets where it has a 
competitive advantage. Public intervention should be restricted to design the common rules 
for rail operators, dictate public service obligations and promote and enforce competition 
policy. Many aspects must be underlined and possibly corrected. However we want to stress 
only few of them as more relevant to promote a better competition for all.  
Firstly, along with the development of competition, on the one hand it will be necessary to 
eliminate the hidden PSOs which would harm the incumbent operator (but also constitute a 
barrier to new and more efficient firms), and on the other hand it is crucial to provide a fair 
access to several types of essential facilities such as stations and maintenance yards, as 
well as to remove the possible favouring subsidies to the incumbent operator. 
Secondly, we see a trend towards liberalisation, but its strength is sometimes weak and 
different in the countries. Furthermore it takes various directions. The consequences of that 
are important and may distort the overall effects of European liberalisation with the rise of 
few dominant railway undertakings from the group of incumbents. The possibility that smaller 
new entrants may seriously affect the larger ones, except for specific niches, is scarce.  
Finally, regulation should be made as much independent as possible. However the conflict of 
interest due to the large public financial participation of the States in the railway industry 
burdens the process. 
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